This Article explores this riddle by reviewing the legal and political events leading up to Arizona v. California. Ultimately, the Article concludes that the decision was a victory for Arizona because, while Arizona had engaged in a strategy of obstruction, California had steadily been using more of the Colorado River's flow. California's use eventually was well above the amount allocated to it in the BCPA-water that would otherwise have gone to Arizona. To secure legal rights to water that California was already putting to a beneficial use, Arizona needed to convince the Supreme Court to depart from established precedent for determining interstate water disputes and ratify the notion that Congress could and had allocated an interstate stream among states. The decision's impact on Arizona cannot be overstated. On its heels came Congressional approval of the Central Arizona Project, which allowed Phoenix and Tucson to develop into major

INTRODUCTION
On June 4, 2013, the State of Arizona celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. California, 1 the seminal case over rights to water from the Colorado River. 2 In celebrating the centennial of Arizona's statehood in February 2012, Arizona Attorney magazine dubbed Arizona v. California the most important case in the state's history. 3 As the lawyers' magazine put it, the series of water disputes between Arizona and California culminating in the Supreme Court decision "remains probably the most significant dispute in Arizona during its first century." 4 In the historic decision the Supreme Court not only awarded Arizona an annual supply of 2.8 million acre-feet of Colorado River water, but also held that this share of the Colorado was in addition to flows from the Gila River. 5 Officials in Arizona reacted to the decision as "a great victory and one of the greatest days in Arizona history." 6 Sherman Hazeltine, a leader in the Central Arizona Project Association, said that the decision "vindicates Arizona's historic position." 7 U.S. Senator Barry M. Goldwater proclaimed that the decision reaffirmed "my long-held convictions that Arizona has been entitled to this water." 8 U.S. Representative John J. Rhodes noted that he was "greatly pleased with this decision. It appears that Arizona got just about all that it could possibly have hoped for." 9 "We have a smashing victory," boasted Charles Reed, the Chief Counsel for the Arizona Interstate Stream Commission. 10 He went on, "Arizona got more Colorado River water for the Central Arizona Project as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision than we claimed when we were before Congress in the late 1940's and early 1950's." 11 1.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) .
Ben Avery, a reporter for the Arizona Republic, reported on June 4, 1963 that "Arizona gave a sigh of relief and joy yesterday that has been pent up for forty years in her battle with California Id.
10.
High Court Water Ruling Called Smashing Victory, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, June 4, 1963, at A12.
11.
Id.
I. COLORADO RIVER COMPACT
As the seven states in the Colorado River Basin ("the Basin") transitioned from their "wild west" beginnings into modern centers of commerce, these states (Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, California, and Arizona) recognized a need for a Basin-wide agreement to determine use of the waters of the Colorado River ("the River") 12 .
Ben Of the Lower Basin states, California had, without question, distinguished itself as the thirstiest. Nevada, with only a toe in the River geographically speaking, had essentially bowed out of any efforts to gain a substantial allocation of River flow early on. 18 Arizona's angst with regard to the Compact was the prospect of losing out to California. 19 It did not want its economic growth to be stunted so that Southern California could continue to prosper. That Southern California had already gained a reputation for shady dealings in water rights negotiations via the Owens Valley saga did not help to create good will. 20 The first effort to negotiate a compact among the basin states was in 1918, when two groups met, one in San Diego; the other in Tucson. 21 The next year, Governor Simon Bamberger of Utah called a meeting in Salt Lake City where the "League of the Southwest" was organized. The League passed resolutions calling for the federal government to develop the water resources of the region's basins. 22 15.
Larry 17. See id.
18.
The seven Basin states met for the Colorado River Conference in Denver in 1927 to attempt to reach an agreement on a division of the River's water in the Lower Basin. At the end of the Conference, California and Arizona had both acceded to Nevada's demand for 0.3 maf of Colorado River water per year, but had not been able to reach an agreement on any other significant issue. NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND 
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states with the goal of dividing the River's waters among them. 23 At the same time, other developments involving the River's flow in the Lower Basin would fan the flame of controversy between Arizona and California over use of the River's water. George H. Maxwell, a prominent political figure in Arizona during the Compact saga and a staunch advocate for the National Reclamation Act of 1902, was, in 1922, busy promoting a newly conceived plan to deliver Colorado River Water into central Arizona.
In 1922, the representatives met in Washington D.C., Cheyenne, Denver, Salt Lake City, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and finally, on November 24, in Santa Fe. 24 While in Washington, two U.S. Congressmen from California, Phil Swing and Hiram Johnson, introduced the first of several Swing-Johnson bills that contained provisions for storage of and power production from the River's flow in the Lower Basin, as well as for construction of an All-American Canal, intended to provide irrigation to California's Imperial Valley. 25 The Colorado River Compact ("Compact") came together in Santa Fe, pushed along by the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Wyoming v. Colorado 26 A. The Compact less than six months earlier. In Wyoming, the Court held that the doctrine of prior appropriation applied to a conflict over an interstate river because both states subscribed to the doctrine. This ruling alerted the Upper Basin states of the urgency of protecting themselves against California's rapidly increasing water diversions, and was undoubtedly influential in the Basin States representatives finally coming to an agreement.
The Compact formed the basis of all subsequent discussion over dividing the River's flow among states. Only three pages in length, the Compact's critical terms were as follows:
The Compact settled on Lee's Ferry as the boundary between the Upper and Lower Basins. 27 It allocated to each basin 7.5 million acre feet ("maf") per year in perpetuity for beneficial consumption. 28 
23.
DELPH 
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increase its consumption by one maf per year for any surplus above 15 maf. 29 The Compact also provided the option for the Basin states to further apportion the River in forty years (October 1, 1963) . 30 It prohibited the Upper Basin from causing the flow at Lee's Ferry to drop below 7.5 maf on a rolling ten-year average. 31 The Compact included within the Basin the drainage area of the entire river system plus all other territory within states for which the waters of the system could be beneficially applied. 32 Under the Compact, use of the River for navigation was to be subservient to domestic, agricultural, and hydro-power use.
That is, member states could transfer waters from the River's hydrologic basin to other areas within the state. 33 Finally, it specified that water for Mexico would come only after each Basin received 7.5 maf and the Lower Basin received an additional one maf. If surplus water proved insufficient, then the deficiency would be split between the two Basins. 34 All seven state representatives in attendance at Santa Fe signed the Compact, 35 which then went to each state's legislature for approval. 38 and they thought it unfair that the Gila River, which is almost entirely within Arizona's borders, 39 was included as a basin-wide resource. Finally, Arizona's powerful mining interests led efforts to prevent ratification of the Compact because it failed to grant Arizona a share of revenues from the generation of hydroelectric power from dams within the state. 40
The "Anti-Pacters"
Hunt's concern about the amount of irrigable acreage in the state was, at least in part, related to a vague plan, just taking shape, for a Central Arizona Project-a massive canal system to supply central Arizona with Colorado River water-referred to at this time as the "Highline Canal Project." 41 Hunt's most trusted advisor on Colorado River issues, Maxwell, had been actively campaigning in favor of the project while the Compact was being negotiated. 42 Even at this early stage, there were those in Arizona who felt the project essential for the state's future economic survival. 43 a. Prior Appropriation As important, many in Arizona feared that ratifying the Compact could allow California to put the River's flow to beneficial use, giving it the right to the River's flow under the doctrine of prior appropriation. Hunt and his backers argued that the Compact would effectively repeal the law of prior appropriation between the basins, which would protect the Upper Basin states from fast-growing California. But the Compact gave no similar protection to Arizona. It would share the 7.5 million acre-feet allocated to the Lower Basin with California and Nevada. Ratifying the Compact would result in much of the River water that flowed into the Lower Basin going to California. Such a development would establish senior rights to most of the water for California, leaving insufficient flow for future growth in Arizona. 44 b. Allocations to Mexico Losing water to Mexico was another concern of those who resisted the Compact. Many, especially large agricultural interests in the state, were disappointed that the Compact placed no restraint on the use of water from the River by Mexico c. Gila River A common theme in Arizona's displeasure with the Compact was its opposition to including Gila River waters in the Compact. Arizona's primary argument for why it should retain exclusive access to Gila River stems from the fact that there were prior appropriation claims to the river's waters long before the Compact was written. Ratifying the compact would effectively reduce Arizona's share of the Gila River while unjustly enriching California. 47 By the time the Compact was created in 1922, central Arizona farmers were already straining their available water sources (the Gila River and its two main tributaries, the Salt and Verde Rivers) because of their need for its waters for power generation and irrigation. Immediately after the Reclamation Act of 1902 48 was signed into law, construction of the Roosevelt Dam east of Phoenix was approved. Central Arizona farmers organized the Salt River Valley Users Association to administer the Salt River Project, the water delivery system created to manage water stored in the Roosevelt dam reservoir. 49 At the time of its completion in 1911, Roosevelt was the largest dam in the world, 50 and it created a reservoir with a storage capacity of 1.382 maf. 51 Between 1923 and Arizona's ratification of the Compact in 1944, three more dams were constructed on the Salt River, and two were constructed on the Verde River. 52 d. Hydro-power
The Compact did not address royalties to be collected by the state from those producing power at plants like those envisaged for the Boulder Canyon area. 53 "Antipacters" 54 
45.
Maddock, supra note 38, at 1.
claimed that Arizona had a right to tax revenues from the dam's generation of electricity, derived from the rightful recognition and establishment of full water rights to the waters flowing within its borders. As a sovereign state, on equal footing with other states, 46 .
47.
Cummings, supra note 15, at 41-42. Eventually, Arizona was able to retain control over the Gila River in the Boulder Canyon Project Act.
48. 
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Arizona had jurisdiction over the bed of streams within its boundaries from high-water mark to high-water mark and over all water that flowed therein. 55 
Two Camps
Many Arizonans, however, supported the Compact. Seen by some as a necessary concession to receive a share of the future benefits of federal projects 56 and supported by others who stood to benefit from the immediate ratification of the Compact, 57 the division between those supporting approval of the Compact and the anti-pacters created a battle remembered as one of the most politically charged periods in Arizona history. 58 Pro-ratification efforts in Arizona were led by U.S. Senator Carl Hayden. Although Hayden sympathized with most of the positions taken by the anti-pacters, he felt that Arizona was not justified in refusing approval of the Compact. Hayden thought that because the Upper Basin would never use its allotted share of the River, Arizona would receive a water supply ample to satisfy all uses, even irrigation from the "Arizona Highline Canal." 59 He felt that the issue of Mexico's share of the River was a federal matter that did not concern the Arizona legislature. 60 He also felt that the disagreement over power generation royalties could be settled in future legislation. 61 And, while Hayden agreed that the Gila should not be included within the Compact, he did not believe the state should jeopardize the entire agreement by amending it to exclude the Gila. 62 Mohave and Yuma counties, on the western side of the state, were heavily in favor of unconditional approval of the Compact. 63 Mohave County, where a future dam springing from the Compact would likely be located, stood to become a chief supply point of labor and materials for its construction. 64 Increases in land values, industrial production, and tourism dollars were also sure to accompany the dam's completion. 65 Yuma County, with its presence on the banks of the Colorado, would benefit immediately from the flood control and irrigation projects that the Compact promised. 66 The period between the signing of the Compact at Santa Fe in November of 1922 and the vote by the Arizona legislature on whether to approve the Compact in February of 1923 was one of fierce campaigning within the state. The most colorful character in the 55.
Maddock, supra note 38, at 23-27. 56.
AUGUST, supra note 19, at 92.
57.
Id. at 102-03.
58.
Id. at 95. 59.
HUNDLEY, supra note 18, at 241.
60.
61.
62.
63.
AUGUST, supra note 19, at 102.
64.
65.
66.
Id. at 103. Despite Maxwell's unsavory reputation among many in western water politics, credible claims arose that it was he, not Hunt, who was truly running the campaign efforts against Arizona's ratification of the Compact. 71 It was claimed that Hunt, in actuality, knew nothing about the Colorado River 72 -he had spent the two years prior to the signing of the Compact abroad as ambassador to Siam 73 -and nearly all his public statements were written by Maxwell. 74 Aside from his anti-Asian paranoia, Hunt was aligning himself with the big economic players in the state. 75 The Salt River Valley Water Users Association feared that cheap federal hydroelectric power would mean unwanted competition with their power production. Agricultural interests resented the prospect of losing the Gila's flow and of Mexican farmers using increased water supplies as a result of the Compact to undercut Arizona farmers' prices. 76 Finally, the mining industry feared that if private power developments were driven out of business, the tax burden on itself would increase. 77 Other powerful interests in the Arizona business community, particularly editorial support from the Arizona Republican, the predecessor to the Arizona Republic, 78 
A Near Miss
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Compact without reservations failed in the House by a vote of twenty-three to twenty-two. 79 The House then considered an amended version of the Compact with reservations. The amended version excluded the Gila from the Compact, capped the water Mexico could receive from the Colorado at two maf per year, and imposed a royalty of five dollars per horsepower per year of electricity generated by Colorado River water imposed by any state with a federal hydroelectric dam built on its land. 80 The amended Compact passed the House by a vote of twenty-eight to seventeen. 81 The Arizona senate then passed legislation approving a different amended version of the Compact. The senate version, which passed by a ten to none vote, provided for a "full and unrestricted right of taxation by way of the imposition of a royalty upon electric power generated from any structure within the state." 82 Neither bill passed in the other chamber, however, and a last-ditch effort by the House to save the compact by passing its unconditional ratification failed on a twenty-two to twentytwo vote. 83 Although water leaders elsewhere in the Basin were still optimistic that Arizona would eventually agree to the Compact, 84 subsequent events cast serious doubt on such optimism. Providing ammunition to those opposed to ratifying the Colorado River Compact, William Mulholland, chief of the City of Los Angeles Bureau of Water Works and Supply, testified in 1924 before the U.S. House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation: "I am here in the interest of a domestic water supply for the City of Los Angeles; and that injects a new phase into this whole matter." 85 In 1927, the governors of the Basin states met in Denver for one last attempt at reconciling lingering disagreements between the Lower Basin states over the Compact.
Indeed it did. His announcement confirmed the most paranoid beliefs of Arizona and the other Colorado River Basin states about the desires of California to corner rights to most of the Colorado River system.
86
California came to the table with an offer: divide the Lower Basin's 7.5 maf apportionment by allowing itself 4.562 maf from the River's main stem and granting Arizona 2.6374 maf from the main stem, plus the waters of its tributaries. 87 The remaining 0.3 maf would be apportioned to Nevada. In addition, after twenty years any apportioned water not being used could be acquired by either state. 88 Arizona summarily rejected this proposal. The Upper Basin states next stepped in with a suggestion of their own. California's allocation would be reduced to 4.2 maf. Arizona would receive 3 maf, plus 1 maf from its tributaries, 89
79.
Id. at 242. but
80.
Id. at 240.
81.
Id. at 242.
82.
Id. at 243.
83.
84.
85.
Id. at 251.
86.
Id. at 264; Cummings, supra note 15, at 29. 87.
HUNDLEY, supra note 18, at 265.
88.
89.
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Arizona would be required to supply Mexico's allotment from its basins. 90 Although Arizona agreed to the Upper Basin states' suggestion, save the Mexico burden, California refused the suggestion outright. 91 Exasperated by Arizona's and California's inability to come to an agreement, Nevada Senator Key Pittman proposed amending the Swing-Johnson Bill-which eventually would become the Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA)-to include a congressionally preapproved Lower-Basin pact. 92 Evidence suggests that the allocation laid out in the amendment, and eventually included in the BCPA, was intended as only a suggested solution. 93 Because it was pre-approved in the Act, the congressional apportionment could be streamlined through Congress if the Lower Basin states later agreed to it. 94 Thirty-five years after the proposed allocation became part of the Swing-Johnson Bill, the Supreme Court declared it to be the Law of the River. 95
II. BOULDER CANYON PROJECT ACT OF 1928
Political opposition to the Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA), unlike the Colorado River Compact, was nearly unanimous in Arizona. Resistance to the BCPA in Arizona came from the Salt River Project, mines, and agriculture. All three feared that California would hoard the water and energy that would come from new hydroelectric dams. Leading the fight against the BCPA was Arizona's legendary politician Carl Hayden. As a U.S. Representative, Hayden, who had supported the Compact, opposed the BCPA on the grounds that "Congress has no right to force adherence to . . . a compact without the full concurrence of the states that would be affected thereby." 96 In 1926, Hayden moved from the House of Representatives, where he had fought against the BCPA's predecessor, the Swing-Johnson Bill, to the United States Senate. A large part of his senatorial campaign rested on his proud opposition to the BCPA. One campaign poster reprinted headlines from California newspapers that showed Hayden's skill at delaying action on the BCPA. 97 
90.
Cummings, supra note 15, at 30. 91.
92.
Id. at 269.
93.
Id. at 269-70.
94.
Id. at 270.
95.
96.
AUGUST, supra note 20, at 126. 97.
See Id. at 129. Thanks to Jack August for permission to reproduce this poster.
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What particularly annoyed Senator Hayden was the disparity in allocation of funds under the BCPA. The legislation provided no funding for reclamation projects in Arizona, while at the same time promising to California $31 million to build the All-American Canal. The BCPA also would provide heavily subsidized electricity from hydroelectric power plants created to supply power to Southern California. No such projects were planned for providing Arizona with cheap power. Hayden did, however, manage to gain important concessions in favor of Arizona. The BCPA was accompanied by the California Limitation Act, which limited California to 4.4 maf of the River's water. 99 In addition, Arizona was guaranteed exclusive rights to the flow of the Gila River, something that Hayden and other key political figures in Arizona had long fought for. Surplus mainstream flow to the Lower Basin would be split equally between Arizona and California. Finally, Arizona, along with Nevada, would each receive 18.75 percent of the surplus profits from hydroelectric power revenues. 100 Section 4 of the BCPA provides that the Act would not take effect until all seven states agree, or six states including California agree. If the Act did take effect, the States of Arizona, California, and Nevada were pre-authorized to enter into an agreement to apportion 4.4 maf to California, 2.8 maf to Arizona, and 0.3 maf to Nevada. Any alternative agreement would need to receive Congressional authorization. There was no obligation on the part of any state to participate in this apportionment. If the apportionment did occur, the Act also provided that the State of Arizona shall have the "exclusive beneficial consumptive use" of the Gila River and its tributaries. 
III. TRANSFORMATIVE YEARS: 1928-1952
A. Courtroom Battles Arizona's unhappiness with the Boulder Canyon Project Act manifested itself immediately. In 1930, two years after passage of the Act, Arizona brought an original jurisdiction suit in the U.S. Supreme Court against the Secretary of the Interior and the six other Colorado River Basin states. 101 Arizona sought an injunction against the federal government from building both the Hoover Dam and the All-American Canal. Additionally, Arizona sought a declaration that both the Colorado River Compact and the BCPA were unconstitutional. Addressing the constitutional claims, Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, held the Act a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 102 
98.
Id. at 136.
Arizona had claimed that its "quasi-sovereign rights" would be invaded by the construction of the dam, because the dam and the reservoir would be located partially within the state. 
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However, the Court held that the federal government could perform its functions without conforming to the police regulations of a state. 103 If Congress has power to authorize construction of a dam and reservoir, the Secretary of the Interior is under no obligation to gain Arizona's approval. 104 The federal government has obvious power to create obstructions on interstate rivers for the purposes of improving navigation. 105 Arizona, quite remarkably, actually challenged whether the Colorado was a navigable river, but the Court had little difficulty in rejecting this claim. 106 Ultimately, the Court dismissed the case because Arizona's claim-that the Act violated Arizona's rights-was speculative. The dismissal was without prejudice. Arizona could apply for subsequent relief if the water stored at Hoover Dam (Lake Mead) was used in such a way as to interfere with Arizona's rights. 107 The [Boulder Canyon Project] Act does not purport to affect any legal right of the State, or to limit in any way the exercise of its legal right to appropriate any of the unappropriated 900,000 acre-feet which may flow within or on its borders.
As Justice Brandeis put it, 108 In 1934, Arizona filed a new suit in the Supreme Court. This case sought to perpetuate testimony in an action arising out of the BCPA, which Arizona would, "at some time in the future," commence against California and the other Basin States. 109 Arizona conceded that its rights had not yet been violated. The Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the testimony that Arizona sought to preserve would not be admissible as evidence of the meaning of the BCPA or the Compact. 110 It reaffirmed that the BCPA did not apportion waters. "[T]he Act does not purport to apportion among the states at the lower basin the waters to which the lower basin is entitled under the Compact. The act merely places limits on California's use of waters under article III(a) and of surplus waters . . ." 111 The next round of United States v. Arizona 112
103.
Id. at 451.
followed after Arizona's governor sent troops to halt construction work on Parker Dam in 1934 . In what is remembered as the "Great Colorado River war of 1934," National Guardsmen moved in a truck convoy from Phoenix over to the construction site of the dam in Parker. It was uproarious from a national perspective, prompting the Los Angeles Times to wryly report on the "impending 104 .
Id Arizona had been knocked down but not defeated. In 1936, Arizona was again before the Court after suing the other Basin States in the Supreme Court, asking the Court to exercise its equitable apportionment authority and to fix the amounts of water that both Arizona and California could claim from the Colorado River. 117 In essence, the State of Arizona asked the Supreme Court for a judicial apportionment of the water among the Lower Colorado River Basin states. Arizona requested that it receive an "equitable share" of the water and that the State of California be prohibited from using more than its equitable share, which would be determined by the Court but would not exceed the limitation imposed upon California's use of such water by the Boulder Canyon Project Act. 118 Arizona also argued that any share of the river to be enjoyed by the Republic of Mexico should come from California's share. 119 The Supreme Court dismissed this effort, because it determined that the United States Government was an indispensable party and it had not consented to be sued. 120 At this point, Arizona was in a bind. The state could not obtain judicial relief until the United States consented to be sued. California, meanwhile, proceeded to enter contracts with the Secretary of the Interior that called for the delivery of 5.3 maf per year.
Ever since the Colorado River Compact was formed, Arizona had been engaging in an obstructive strategy. 121 It was not working. Arizona failed in three Supreme Court suits. In the meantime, it had created no official state planning effort and no state agency with planning authority. 122 Arizona had no unified position or organization for advancing its cause. 123 113.
NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST 229-30 (rev. ed. 2001).
Throughout Arizona's flurry of lawsuits, there was no great driving force for new water development in the state. Arizona had, instead, only vague plans for using its share of 114 .
Id. at 230.
115.
116.
Id. 117.
Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 558-60 (1936).
118.
Id. at 559-60.
119.
Id. at 560.
120.
Id. at 572.
121.
See Johnson, supra note 24, at 18.
122.
123.
Id. at 19.
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the Colorado. 124 The state had, therefore, focused its efforts on obstructing California, where the drive for new projects that would deprive Arizona of future water was strong. 125 As the 1930s came to an end, Arizona became more proactive. By 1938, the state legislature had created the Colorado River Commission of Arizona (CRCA). In 1939, the CRCA filed an application with the Federal Power Commission for a preliminary permit to construct a dam in Bridge Canyon. 126 That same year, Arizona applied to the federal government for a contract to have Colorado River water delivered to the state from Lake Mead, for the first time acknowledging the federal government's authority to enter into such contracts. 127 
B. Changing Tactics
Several events influenced Arizona's change in position. For one, the state's former strategy had simply failed. 128 Arizona realized no significant benefit from its series of Supreme Court cases. In addition, Arizona foresaw that a U.S. treaty with Mexico to deliver Colorado River water was imminent. 129 Finally, in 1939, the Metropolitan Water District began diverting water from Lake Havasu. 130 More than two decades of resistance collapsed, as Arizona feared that the new demands by Mexico and California would leave it in the dust. Somehow, Arizona had to put Colorado River water to beneficial use or else, under the prior appropriation doctrine, it would lose out to California and Mexico. 131 In 1944, the United States signed a treaty with Mexico that granted Mexico 1.5 maf of Colorado River water and California announced plans to increase its annual diversions from the river by 2 maf. But Arizona, too, was making moves. In 1944 the Arizona legislature finalized a water delivery contract with the Secretary of the Interior for 2.8 maf annually while simultaneously, after twenty-two years of resistance, ratifying the Colorado River Compact.
If Arizona were to maintain any hope of future vitality, a change in strategy was necessary.
Still, the Central Arizona Project-the reason why Arizona fought so hard to keep California from taking what Arizona felt was its share of the River's flow-remained an abstract notion, with no concrete plan. 132 Serious efforts to work with the Bureau of Reclamation on creating such a plan, however, would soon be underway. 133 
124.
125.
Id. at 18.
126.
127.
128.
Id. at 19-20.
129.
130.
Id. at 20.
131.
See AUGUST, supra note 19, at 150-51. 132.
JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 21.
133.
See id. at 20-21.
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In 1946, the private non-profit CAP Association was organized, and a year later, after Arizona U.S. Senator Ernest McFarland introduced a bill in the Senate to authorize the CAP, the Association organized hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Committee on Public Lands. 134 In 1948, Arizona created the Arizona Interstate Stream Commission (its own agency to handle Colorado River matters for the state including the CAP).. 135 Also in 1948, the CAP plan report was approved by Secretary of the Interior Krug and submitted to Congress. 136 In the 1920's, Senator Hayden delayed passage of the Boulder Canyon Project Act and prevented California from using Colorado River water. Now the shoe was on the other foot. California took advantage of its superior numbers in the House of Representatives to prevent authorization of the Central Arizona Project.
The CAP finally seemed on its way to becoming a reality. California, however, had other ideas, and it would fight federal authorization of the project to the bitter end. California's primary goal, much like Arizona's in earlier decades, was obstruction. On February 21, 1950, due largely to Hayden's influence in the Senate, bill S 75, authorizing the CAP, passed the Senate by a vote of 55-28. 140 But California was committed to delaying a vote on the CAP in the House, where its superior numbers afforded it greater influence. At this time California had twenty-three representatives in the House, compared to two for Arizona. 141 During the 81st Congress, California representatives introduced twenty-three separate Colorado River bills, referring the entire question of water rights to the Judiciary Committee-a clear attempt to delay. 142 
134.
Id. at 31.
Most observers close to the legislation knew that Arizona Governor Howard Pyle was present at the Committee hearing to testify. Upon witnessing the events that had just unfolded before him, Pyle set aside his prepared statement, and instead addressed the Committee with these words: 149 In 1952, Arizona appealed once more to the Supreme Court in regard to its Colorado River water rights. California responded to Arizona's complaint to the Court that it interposed no objection to the Court granting Arizona's motion to file the bill of complaint. 150 Next, the U.S. Solicitor General requested permission to intervene, which was granted. 151 IV. ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA
The most significant lawsuit in Arizona's history had begun.
A. Early Litigation
Arizona v. California proved to be one of the most complex and fiercely contested cases in Supreme Court history. 152 
143.
The Court appointed a special master, George I. Haight,
144.
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to hear arguments. 153 After his sudden death before formal hearings began, the Court appointed as his replacement Simon Rifkind, a prominent New York City federal district court judge and former partner at Paul Weiss. 154 California grounded its position on both the Boulder Canyon Project Act and its contracts with the Secretary of the Interior. 155 Before the Special Master, California argued that the prior appropriation doctrine should govern and protect its use of Colorado River water. Established Supreme Court doctrine supported this position. 156 Both California and Arizona were and are prior appropriation doctrine states. California, therefore, had a good argument that the doctrine should apply to conflicts over the Colorado. Because California had entered into contracts with the Secretary of the Interior for 5.3 maf annually, it should be entitled to this amount. 157 In response, Arizona asserted that California had agreed to be bound by 4.4 maf, both based on the 1929 Boulder Canyon Project Act and on the California Limitation Act. 158 But California responded that Arizona's failure to ratify the Colorado River Compact, together with its efforts to have both the Compact and the Boulder Canyon Project Act declared unconstitutional, should prevent Arizona from relying on either one. 159 In the early part of the litigation, the chief lawyer for Arizona was John Frank of the Phoenix law firm Lewis & Roca. His task was to figure out some standard that would quantify Arizona's water rights, no small task given that Arizona wanted no part of either the Colorado River Compact in 1922 or the Boulder Canyon Project Act in 1928. He decided to rely on the "equitable apportionment doctrine," which the Supreme Court had developed in resolving interstate disputes over water. 160 His argument was, in effect, if Arizona could prove a need for water, that should determine its right to the water. 161 It was a squishy argument, for California could with equal plausibility assert its own need to a substantial amount of water. Plus California was already using the water through several aqueducts constructed in the late 1930s and 1940s. 162 
153.
Id. at 177.
In contrast, Arizona had no conveyance system, i.e., no Central Arizona Project, to move large quantities of water from the mainstem to Arizona's population centers located in the central and southern parts of the state.
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See Id. at 63.
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See the list of California aqueduct projects from this time period provided, infra note 228.
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California's chief counsel Northcutt Ely's reliance on prior appropriation made a great deal of sense. In the early-twentieth century decisions, 163 the U.S. Supreme Court had, under its equitable apportionment jurisdiction, used prior appropriation to divide the waters when both states relied on the prior appropriation doctrine. In the Colorado River Basin, all seven states employed the prior appropriation doctrine. 164 Ely argued that California had prior appropriation rights to 5.3 maf pursuant to contracts with the Secretary of the Interior. Pouring salt in the wound, California argued that the million acre-feet that Arizona used from the Gila River should be deducted from its mainstream claim. 165 And as a matter of equity, Arizona's claim of water for its farms and ranches should not come at the expense of California's rapidly increasingly populated urban areas. 166 Trial before Special Master Rifkin began in 1956 and did not go well for Arizona. The state claimed that it was entitled to 2.8 maf, but its attorneys failed to cite any legal authority for this proposition. Arizona was arguing as a matter of fairness that it should have this amount of water from the river "in order to sustain its economy." 167 B. Arizona's Argument before the Supreme Court A simple claim that the prosperity of the state was a reason to give it water was unlikely to be successful.
In 1957, Arizona changed course and retained new counsel, Mark Wilmer, senior partner of the Snell & Wilmer law firm in Phoenix. 168 According to his biographer, Jack August, Wilmer found his predecessor's legal reasoning rather baffling. 169 It was vague, and not likely to be persuasive to the Supreme Court, which would have to come up with some actual numbers to apportion the River. The Supreme Court might actually use the equitable apportionment doctrine to cut against Arizona, particularly if it decided to use the prior appropriation doctrine. Wilmer decided to embark on an unorthodox and risky but ultimately necessary strategy. He filed an "Amended and Supplemental Statement of Position" in 1957 in which he conceded that Arizona's earlier "Statement of Position . . . and certain legal conclusions and arguments set forth in its various pleadings filed herein unsound and not supported in the law in relation to the proper interpretation of [the Boulder Canyon Project Act and the Colorado River Compact]." 170 Instead Wilmer argued that the Colorado River Compact and especially the Boulder Canyon Project Act awarded Arizona 2.8 maf and protected its rights to sole use of the Gila
163.
See "The Supreme Court's Equitable Apportionment Doctrine" infra p. 25. 164.
AUGUST, supra note 160, at 69.
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River. 171 It was an audacious argument for a state that, for decades, had refused to go along with either the Compact or the Act. In a neat twist, he used the Compact and the Act to insist that Arizona had rights to the Gila River based on Article 8, which protects present perfected rights. 172 It was a nervy argument to make for another reason. At the time that he made it, Arizona had already completed the trial of its case in brief. This had consumed 37 trial days, amassed some 5,000 pages of testimony, and included 200 exhibits that comprised an additional 10,000 pages. 173 The State of California had almost completed its presentation of evidence, and now found itself in mid-litigation, having to respond to an entirely different legal theory. 174 
C. The Supreme Court's Equitable Apportionment Doctrine
To grasp the audacity and brilliance of this change, it is necessary first to review the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to the equitable apportionment doctrine in interstate water rights disputes.
Prior to 1907, the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction cases between states were primarily confined to disputes over boundaries. 175 The seminal equitable apportionment of water decision was the 1907 case, Kansas v. Colorado. 176 The diminution of the flow of water in the river by the irrigation of Colorado has worked some detriment to the southwestern part of Kansas, and yet when we compare the amount of this detriment with the great benefit which has obviously resulted to the counties in Colorado, it would seem that equality of right and equity between the two States forbids any interference with the present withdrawal of water in Colorado for purposes of irrigation.
In that dispute, Kansas sued to enjoin Colorado from using the Arkansas River, which runs through both states. Colorado countered that its territorial sovereignty gave it the right to drain the entire flow of the river. The Court sided with Colorado, though not with its rationale, and dismissed the Kansas complaint. The Court reasoned that each state had an equal right to the river's flow, and the amount of water each state was entitled to should be based on an equitable apportionment. 
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The Kansas v. Colorado decision established the Court's jurisdiction over interstate water disputes and announced a sharing rule, which was essentially a crude cost-benefit analysis of alternative water uses. 178 Early cases did not consider local law as a factor in equitable apportionment, but in 1911 in Bean v. Morris, Justice Holmes applied the doctrine of prior appropriation in an interstate stream dispute on the theory that when all states through which a river flowed had adopted the same system of water law, they estopped themselves from asserting the power to ignore out-of-state priorities. 179 In 1922, the Court relied on Bean in its first substantive decision apportioning water in an interstate dispute. 180 In Wyoming v. Colorado, Wyoming brought an action against Colorado-both of which are prior appropriation states-to protect irrigators in Wyoming from proposed upstream diversions from the Laramie River in Colorado. 181 The Court integrated state water laws into its equitable apportionment ruling, and awarded Wyoming based on priority, 272,500 acre-feet of the 288,000 acre-feet of dependable annual flow. 182 The Court downgraded local law to a "guiding principle" twenty-two years later in Nebraska v. Wyoming. 183 To protect the flow of the North Platte River for irrigation purposes, Nebraska sued the upstream state of Wyoming, which impleaded Colorado. Unlike Wyoming v. Colorado, where the Court was faced with a new use conflicting with an established use, Nebraska v. Wyoming was a conflict between two established uses. This distinction prompted the Court to depart from its holding in Wyoming v. Colorado, holding that it would not strictly follow the prior appropriation doctrine if doing so came at the expense of equity and justice. 184 This line of cases represented the state of the equitable apportionment doctrine when Arizona challenged California's apportionment of the Colorado River. But the years since Nebraska v. Wyoming had ushered in a new era of federal involvement in interstate water issues. 185 Federal flood control and reclamation projects, like the ones at the center of Arizona's suit against California, had opened the door to challenge the long established law limiting the federal government's power over interstate water issues to navigation protection. 186 
178.
Tarlock, supra note 175, at 386-87.
The legal argument and facts were there for Arizona to challenge the traditional doctrine of interstate water disputes. It just needed a lawyer with the vision to pull it off.
179.
Id Under Congress' commerce clause power over navigable streams, Congress has power to divide the un-appropriated waters of the Colorado River among the Lower Basin States.
The case was set for re-argument the following year after retired Justices Whittaker and Frankfurter were replaced by Justices Goldberg and White. Chief Justice Warren, former governor and attorney general of California, recused himself from the case. The Court heard six more hours of argument in October 1962. The Court's 5-3 opinion, written by Justice Black, adopted most of the recommendations of the Special Master. The Court's most significant holdings are summarized as follows: 188 Congress exercised its apportionment power in the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, both by dividing the river itself and by delegating authority to the Secretary of the Interior to enter into contracts with states for use of the water. Under the apportionment set up by Congress, California would receive 4.4 maf plus not more than one-half of any surplus. Arizona would receive 2.8 maf and Nevada 0.3 maf.
The effect of this ruling was to recognize congressional power to apportion the waters of the navigable rivers as a third method for dividing a stream among multiple states, in addition to division by interstate compact and by equitable apportionment under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Before Arizona v. California, most experts thought that navigable interstate rivers could only be divided by compact or equitable apportionment jurisdiction.
189
The BCPA applies only to the River's mainstem, not to its tributaries. 190 The Secretary of the Interior has authority to divide the mainstem by contract, subject to the BCPA limitation that California would receive a maximum of 4.4 maf. This delegated authority allows the Secretary to allocate water among states and among users within each state. The Secretary had done so by executing contracts for the delivery of water with the three Lower Basin states. In granting this authority, the Court did insist that the Secretary protect "present perfected rights," defined as those in effect as of June 25, 1929.
Tributaries remain the exclusive use of the state. This ruling was very important for Arizona, because the Gila River's annual flow is two to three maf. 191 
187.
AUGUST, supra note 160, at 88.
The most senior rights on the river, especially the 3 maf then being used in the Imperial Irrigation District, could, therefore, not be diminished by any contract entered into by the Secretary.
188.
Arizona, 373 U.S. at 597-98.
189.
Id. at 564-65.
190.
Id. at 574-75.
191.
Id. at 600.
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In the event of a shortage, the Secretary has discretion to allocate water as Congress may direct, or in the exercise of his discretion. 192 Federal law controls both the interstate and intrastate distribution of water, not state prior appropriation law. It is the Act and the contracts with the Secretary that govern.
A pro rata system of reduction based on the percentage of each state's rights may be appropriate, but that is not the only option available to the Secretary. Again the Secretary must satisfy "present perfected rights." 193 Indian reservations and other federal reserves are entitled to water necessary to accomplish their purposes. The priority date for these federal reserved rights is the time at which the reservations were established. For the five Indian reservations along the Colorado River, tribes will receive the amount of water necessary to irrigate the "practicably irrigable acreage" on the reservations. 194
V. THE AFTERMATH
A. California's Viewpoint
Californians were naturally unhappy with the decision. Particularly frustrating was the Court's dramatic departure from previous interstate water rights cases. Many felt the decision was flawed. The premier historian of Arizona v. California, UCLA historian Norris Hundley, Jr., has written that "the practical result of [Arizona v. California] was a tremendous victory for Arizona," 195 and the result "bitterly disappointed" California interests. 196 Hundley thinks that the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. California was "based on a faulty reading of the historical record." 197 
192.
Id. at 594.
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Id. at 586.
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Id. at 600-01. 195.
HUNDLEY, supra note 113, at 305.
196.
Id. at 306.
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Id. The argument that Hundley makes is that the Court in Arizona v. California relied heavily but mistakenly on two provisions in the BCPA that it understood as being inserted in the final version of the Swing-Johnson Bill (that became the BCPA). Those provisions, in Sections 5 and 8(b), had been inserted into the bill in an earlier version, two years prior, for completely different reasons. Section 5 of the BCPA authorized the Secretary of the Interior to make "a complete statutory apportionment," which the Court interpreted as authorizing the Secretary to make water apportionments between the Lower Basin states in times of shortage. In reality, when this provision was added two years earlier it was intended to ensure a way for the federal government to repay the cost of the Boulder Canyon project by requiring water users to contract with the Secretary for water delivery contracts so as to provide revenues. 
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In a January 1972 article, Hundley parsed the legislative record to demonstrate that it was exceedingly unlikely that Congress intended the Boulder Canyon Project Act to apportion water. 198 This argument still holds sway over some modern scholars. 199 In the midst of the legislative deliberations, Nevada Senator Key Pittman proposed an amendment that "authorized" the Lower Basin States to enter into an agreement apportioning the River. Hayden opposed Senator Pittman's proposal. Hayden wanted explicit concession by California to the provisions, more than a mere "request of the Congress." In defense of Arizona v. California, the Court acted precisely because the states and Congress did not. The reason why Arizona and California were before the Court in the first place was because the states could not agree and Congress, in 1951, refused to act on the Central Arizona Project until the Court determined each state's rights to the River. The Court stepped in to fill a vacuum, and did so by using numbers that had already been debated and agreed to by Congress. Also important, California had agreed to limit itself to an annual apportionment of 4.4 maf in the 1929 California Limitation Act. Early in the legislative deliberations, the State of Nevada indicated that it would be satisfied to receive broadly construing Congress's power over interstate commerce. "States' rights" was more than a hollow slogan at that time, and the idea that Congress could itself determine individual states' apportionments of water seemed far-fetched. But if the River was not apportioned based on the BCPA, then what basis was there for apportionment?
"The legislative record is less revealing about the reasons for Section 8(b)," but it was apparently also "closely related to the revenue question," and was created as a way of "avoiding difficulties which might follow from rushing precipitously into the negotiation of the necessary revenue contracts," not specifying that Congress should apportion the waters in the Lower Basin. Id. at 27.
198.
Id.
199.
See Much of the credit for the Court's ruling turned on the good lawyering of Mark Wilmer. Upon taking over the case, Wilmer changed Arizona's legal argument from a general claim under the equitable apportionment rules for a reasonable amount of water for the state's needs-an argument that followed established Supreme Court precedent-to a novel claim that the Boulder Canyon Project Act had settled the matter. Wilmer's strategy, though bold and risky, annoyed many Westerners who viewed prior appropriation as a religious doctrine and the federal government as mere meddlesome interference in state sovereignty. To them, Arizona was apparently selling out by arguing for a repressively broad interpretation of federal power.
From the Court's perspective, however, this was a very helpful legal strategy. Had the Court used equitable apportionment principles, under Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Court would have had to buy the argument that despite California's prior rights to much of the River's flow, Arizona was entitled to 2.8 maf based on principles of equity and justice alone. Such a ruling would have exposed the Court to ridicule for seemingly making up the rules out of whole cloth. In Nebraska the Court listed seven factors that may justify deviation from strictly adhering to the prior appropriation doctrine:
(1) Physical and climatic conditions; It is far from clear that these factors, on balance, favored Arizona. Instead the Court simply relied upon numbers that Congress had already approved.
Papers of the Justices in the case, which, until recently, had not been publicly reported, however, tell a slightly different story of the Court's rationale in Arizona v. California. 205 
203.
See Hundley, supra note 197, at 22.
A fact that is often overlooked by historians is that Justice Black, author of the Court opinion and leading the pro-congressional apportionment group in the Court, was a
204.
Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 618. 205.
The justices' papers were first brought to light by Patashnik, supra note 2 (manuscript at 22).
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Senator representing Alabama at the time the BCPA was passed. 206 The Justices' papers reveal that Black was adamant behind closed doors that Congress' intention in passing the BCPA was, in fact, to apportion the River. 207 Justice Black's conviction was undoubtedly influential on at least some of his fellow justices. What was perhaps more influential, however, as the papers reveal, was the sentiment among those in the pro-apportionment camp that the case presented a major problem with national implications. 208 It was a problem that should be settled by the federal government. 209 The Court's opinion, therefore, may not have been based on a close reading of the BCPA. 210 There is tremendous irony in the Boulder Canyon Project Act history. If the waters had indeed been apportioned by the BCPA, the Lower Basin states "were apparently unaware of it, for they spent the next 30-35 years in futile attempts to divide the water among themselves or to persuade the Supreme Court to do it for them." 211 Even the earlier Supreme Court rulings did not interpret the BCPA as making apportionment. In the 1931 version of Arizona v. California, the Court stated that the Boulder Canyon Project Act did not "affect any legal right" or "limit in any way" a state's "legal right to appropriate any of the unappropriated" waters of the River. 212 Justice Brandeis made the same point in the 1934 decision. 213 The Arizona v. California decision allowed Congress to use principles for allocating water that were based neither on prior appropriation nor riparianism. 214 
C. Reactions
California lost a substantial amount of water even though it had established uses for that water and, under the prior appropriation doctrine, would have had those rights securely protected.
As for the significance of Arizona v. California, Norris Hundley described the decision in Arizona v. California as "the first major setback to California's water seekers" and as "a tremendous victory for Arizona." 215 Arizona Senator Jon J. Kyl has stated that it "helped secure for Arizona a substantial water supply, thereby removing the only obstacle to growth and prosperity in Arizona." 216 
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Some Californians began planning to block Arizona from using its full allocation of Colorado River flow. The state attorney general, Stanley Most, echoed the sentiments of many in California who were savvy about the state's water issues when he stated, "water will not be short in California until new projects in other states have been authorized by Congress and completed." 225 Californians were confident they could determine when or whether such projects were initiated because their thirty-eight congressmen could reject any proposed federal water projects on the Colorado that they felt were disadvantageous for the state. 226 An L.A. Times editorial used more combative terms: "It is in Congress . . . that the fight for water justice must be waged. The first action should be a moratorium on any new projects on the Colorado until the secretary's powers are spelled out." 227 In the water-rich East, reactions were more detached and subdued. The Washington Post stated of the Court's opinion: "The solution thus effected seems to us equitable in accord with the agreement among the states, and conducive to a balanced development of the West." 228 The Post acknowledged, "California is naturally disappointed, but it can draw on water resources in the northern part of the state." 229 "Arizona," however, "is almost entirely dependent on the Colorado. The state is now overdrawing its water supply by 2.5 million acre-feet per year, and its population is growing rapidly." 230 Instead of reflecting on whether the ruling was a "smashing victory" 231 or whether it necessitated a "fight for water justice," 232 the eastern media's focus was on Washington's, particularly Secretary Udall's, efforts to going forward for "a regional approach to the water needs of the rapidly growing Pacific southwest." 233 
D. A New Water Future for Arizona
Several aspects of the decision suggest that the ruling was a "smashing victory" for Arizona. Arizona obtained rights to a specific quantity of the Colorado River water. It had been seeking such an adjudication for decades. In addition, the Court rejected the claim by California that its rights should be judged by the prior appropriation doctrine, a ruling that would have greatly favored California, which had been diverting millions of acre-feet for decades. Using the prior appropriation doctrine would have significantly limited Arizona's rights because Arizona still had not secured its long-desired delivery system for moving water from the Colorado River to Phoenix and Tucson.
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By protecting Arizona's rights to the Gila River, the ruling had also quelled fears that haunted Arizona since negotiations over the Colorado River Compact began. Water from the Gila River would not count against Arizona's 2.8 maf apportionment, and the United States' obligation to the Republic of Mexico would have to be shared by all Colorado River basin states. 234 California, which had been diverting more than 5 maf from the River, would now be limited to 4.4 maf. In the decades between the BCPA and the Court's decision, however, state leaders believed that the River had much more water than had been allocated. On the basis of this assumption, California had already contracted with the Secretary of the Interior for a total of 5,362,000 acre-feet of Colorado River water. 235 To transport this water, California had built expensive aqueducts, which had supplied southern California farms and cities with Colorado River water for decades. 236 Finally, the opinion paved the way for Arizona to seek approval of and funding for the Central Arizona Project. California had stonewalled the state's long-coveted project for years because Congress refused to consider the matter unless and until Arizona had specific contracts with the Secretary or had obtained a judicial decree allocating specific rights to water from the Colorado River. California from gaining rights to the entire flow of the Lower Basin, Arizona embarked on a decades long obstructionist strategy that was, in the end, utterly unsuccessful. In the meantime, the population of California had grown substantially and the State had signed contracts with the Secretary for 5.3 maf. So, by the time Arizona was ready to use the water that it initially rejected as not enough, the water was no longer available.
If the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. California used the established equitable apportionment doctrine, it might have used the prior appropriation doctrine embraced by both Arizona and California, as the Court had done in Nebraska v. Wyoming. This would have resulted in California getting more than the 4.4 maf it was apportioned in the BCPA. Instead, Arizona convinced the Court to venture from its established doctrine and subscribe to a new rationale, effectively cutting California back to 4.4 maf. The answer to the riddle, therefore, could be stated this way: Arizona's "smashing victory" in the 1963 Supreme Court decision was a success, not because Arizona won what had already been awarded to it through the BCPA, but because Arizona lost its BCPA allocation to California largely through its own missteps, then pulled a rabbit out of a hat.
E. Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968 and the Central Arizona Project
Arizona v. California was an absolute predicate if Arizona was to secure funding for construction of the Central Arizona Project. Now armed with the Supreme Court's 1964 decree awarding the state 2.8 maf and protecting the state's rights to the Gila River and its tributaries, there would be plenty of water to fill the Central Arizona Project canal. There were still several years of political battles with California to overcome before the CAP was officially approved. The process culminated in 1968, with the Colorado River Basin Project Act (CRBPA). 237 But what Arizona won in one breath was taken away in the next. The CRBPA secured the support of California's congressional delegation for funding of the CAP, but Arizona had to concede to California that, during times of shortage, California's 4.4 maf would be superior to the rights of both Nevada and Arizona. 238 Indeed, the 1.4 maf of Arizona's rights that would be delivered through the Central Arizona Project were relegated to the lowest priority level-a necessary concession to get the support of California's congressional delegation. At the time, this did not seem to be a big deal. Most observers believed that the River routinely carried 20 to 22 maf. 239 But subsequent analysis by scientists at the University of Arizona Tree Ring Laboratory showed that the annual reliable supply of the River is closer to 13 or 14 maf. 240 This concern is magnified when one considers the recent increase in water use in the Upper Basin. The negotiations and conflicts leading up to and including Arizona v. California and the approval of the CAP were carried out with the underlying assumption that With these adjusted flows, the lowest priority goes from "no big deal" to a potential catastrophe. 
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the Upper Basin would never use its entire 7.5 maf share. Congress ended up approving the CAP with full knowledge that much of the water for the project would come from the Upper Basin's unused apportionment, and the Upper Basin went along with the decision because of their belief that the Compact protected their water interests. 241 That the Upper Basin will in the near future use enough of its water to push up against the Lower Basin's established uses now seems inevitable. When this moment comes, the Basin states will discover whether the Upper Basin's reliance on the water rights provided to it by the Compact was justified. 242 If not, another great water conflict might be in the Basin's future. 243 Although Arizona could be said to have achieved a "smashing victory" in the battle over the allocation of Colorado River water rights in Arizona v. California, the River's inherent inconsistencies combined with increased variability in future years due to climate change and the looming issue of the Upper Basin's rights mean that the war over the River's flow is not over.
CONCLUSION: FROM SURPLUS TO SHORTAGE
Over the last twenty years, the Law of the River has worked, thanks partly to previously unimagined cooperation among the seven Basin states. What began in the 1990s with intense discussions about developing criteria for sharing surplus on the river, turned quickly to an urgent need to develop criteria for sharing expected shortages on the River, and morphed into a remarkable recognition by the Bureau of Reclamation that the era of largescale augmentation projects was over. Finally, new Minutes to the 1944 U.S.-Mexico treaty brought Mexico into the seven Basin states discussions as a full partner regarding both surpluses and shortages, while simultaneously embarking on a trial program to ensure flows to the Colorado River Delta.
Even though the 1964 Decree in Arizona v. California made clear that California's rights were 4.4 maf, the state continued to divert in excess of 5 maf annually. It did so thanks to a provision in the Decree that allows the Secretary of the Interior to declare the River in a surplus condition and authorize a state to use some of that surplus water. 244 From the 1960s until the new millennium, that surplus condition existed primarily because the Upper Basin States used a relatively small fraction of their entitlement and Arizona, even after the completion of the Central Arizona Project, still only used a fraction of its rights. 245 
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Basin states, he insisted that California develop a plan for reducing its diversions from 5.3 maf to its allotted 4.4 maf. California created such a plan in 2003. 246 Meanwhile, another development completely shifted the focus from surplus to shortage. In 1996, the Arizona legislature created the Arizona Water Bank, an apparently innocent-sounding conservation mechanism by which the state would store its currently unneeded excess allocation of Colorado River water in aquifers around the state. 247 Between 1997 and 2013, the Central Arizona Project stored more than 2 maf in recharge basins around the state.
The creative geniuses behind this plan, Rita Pearson, then-Director of the Department of Water Resources and her chief legal counsel, Mike Pearce, dressed this up as a sensible, long-term conservation program that demonstrated how a state as arid as Arizona could protect itself in the future by saving for the rainy day, or lack thereof. But, it was also a reaction to what had long been a source of irritation to Arizona officials-that California continued to divert so much more water than it was allotted. 248 The amount stored rises to 8 maf when one also considers the use of CAP water in lieu of groundwater for agricultural irrigation. 249 In a couple of years, Arizona moved from diverting roughly 700,000 af to diverting almost 1.4 maf-the entire Central Arizona Project allocation. 250 Arizona also began to bank water for the State of Nevada. 251 Nevada may subsequently recover this water, which it will take from Lake Mead, while Arizona will take less water through the Central Arizona Project.
